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1. Introduction 
Jim Bogen and James Woodward’s ‘Saving the Phenomena’, published only twenty years 
ago, has become a modern classic. Their centrepiece idea is a distinction between data and 
phenomena. Data are typically the kind of things that are publicly observable or measurable 
like “bubble chamber photographs, patterns of discharge in electronic particle detectors and 
records of reaction times and error rates in various psychological experiments” (p. 306). 
Phenomena are “relatively stable and general features of the world which are potential objects 
of explanation and prediction by general theory” and are typically unobservable (Woodward 
1989, p. 393). Examples of the latter category include “weak neutral currents, the decay of the 
proton, and chunking and recency effects in human memory” (Bogen and Woodward 1988, p. 
306). Theories, in Bogen and Woodward’s view, are utilised to systematically explain and 
predict phenomena, not data (pp. 305-306). The relationship between theories and data is 
rather indirect. Data count as evidence for phenomena and the latter in turn count as evidence 
for theories. This view has been further elaborated in subsequent papers (Bogen and 
Woodward 1992, 2005 and Woodward 1989) and is becoming increasingly influential (e.g. 
Prajit K. Basu 2003, Stathis Psillos 2004 and Mauricio Suárez 2005).  
 
In this paper I argue contrary to Bogen and Woodward that data serve as evidence for 
theories, not only for phenomena. Bogen and Woodward seem to forget the old Duhemian 
dictum that ‘theories cannot be tested in isolation’. That is, they seem to forget that theories 
require the help of auxiliary hypotheses to make contact with data. When augmented with 
suitable auxiliaries, theories do entail, predict and potentially explain the data. I say 
‘potentially explain the data’ because my focus in this paper is only on the inferential and 
predictive relations between theories, phenomena and data. To demonstrate my claim I 
examine four cases from physics, chemistry and astronomy: (i) a controversy between 
Lavoisier and Priestley, (ii) the calculation of lead’s melting point, (iii) the prediction of the 
Poisson spot and (iv) the discovery of Neptune. The first of these is discussed in Basu (op. 
cit.) and the second in Bogen and Woodward (1988). The last two have not yet been discussed 
in the context of Bogen and Woodward’s work but they are widely discussed in confirmation 
theory as paradigmatic examples of novel predictions. The choice of cases reflects my desire 
to assess Bogen and Woodward’s view (1) under the best light by considering one of their 
principal examples as well as a meticulously discussed example from one of their devotees 
and (2) under the most stringent confirmation criteria by considering two exemplary cases of 
novel prediction. 
 
2. The Lavoisier-Priestley Controversy 
Basu (op. cit.) argues that for observations to be of use in theory testing, they first need to be 
transformed into evidence. Since the transformation, according to him, involves the 
introduction of theoretical vocabulary, the end-product is theory-laden. Basu motivates his 
claims using a distinction between raw (observational) data and evidence that is explicitly 
modelled on Bogen and Woodward’s distinction.1 Following Bogen and Woodward, he 
claims that theories do not entail, predict or explain observation statements or data, not even 
with the help of suitable theoretical auxiliaries. This prevents any direct observational 
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 Although Basu agrees with much of what Bogen and Woodward have to say, he thinks that their distinction “is 
inadequate in handling cases of ‘revolutions’ in science” (p. 354). 
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assessment of theories (plus auxiliaries).2 To support his claims, Basu considers in detail a 
rather well-known controversy between Antoine Lavoisier and Joseph Priestley. 
 
The controversy concerns two conflicting results emanating from what appear to be the same 
experiments independently carried out by the two scientists. Both scientists were in agreement 
that the observable result of the experiments was the production of a black powder with 
certain properties.3 Since their respective theories of oxygen and of phlogiston do not speak of 
(or indeed entail) the presence of black powder, the observable result cannot immediately be 
used for theory adjudication. The raw observational data first has to be theoretically treated. 
This is where the disagreement arose. For Priestley, who advocated the phlogiston theory, 
when iron is heated in dephlogisticated air it leads to the production of iron calx. For 
Lavoisier, an advocate of the oxygen theory, the heating of iron in oxygen leads to the 
production of iron oxide. Yet, the presence of iron calx is only entailed by the phlogiston 
theory and the presence of iron oxide is only entailed by the oxygen theory. In other words, 
the same observation (i.e. the presence of a particular kind of black powder) is theoretically 
interpreted – out of necessity, for on its own, Basu claims, it is not evidentially potent – as 
two different evidential statements, each only confirming its respective theory.  
 
Although Basu takes theoretical auxiliaries as necessary for the transformation of 
observations into evidence, he insists that they cannot help infer the relevant observation 
statements from the given theory. In the case at hand, this means that the presence of that 
particular kind of black powder cannot be inferred from either of the two theories. To see this 
point, let’s formalise the aforementioned statements. Let O1: Iron is heated in oxygen, O2: 
Iron is heated in dephlogisticated air, E1: Iron oxide is produced, E2: Iron calx is produced, B: 
Black powder with certain observable properties is present, L: O1 → E1, P: O2 → E2, A1: B → 
E1 and A2: B → E2. L is a central theoretical claim in Lavoisier’s theory and P the one in 
Priestley’s theory. A1 and A2 are theoretical auxiliaries that respectively allow each scientist 
to go from observation to evidence.4 Consider Lavoisier’s theory. From O1 and L, we can 
infer E1 but not B. To confirm Lavoisier’s theory we must assume A1 which together with B 
entail E1. Thus, to confirm Lavoisier’s theory (or at least one of its parts, i.e. L), we must first 
transform B into an evidentially relevant statement (i.e. E1) using theoretical auxiliary A1. 
Notice that if we add A1 to the set of statements {O1, L} we still cannot infer B. This seems to 
vindicate Basu’s point that even with the help of theoretical auxiliaries we cannot infer the 
observational statement. In his own words, “…the construction of E1 in (1) [i.e. the 
proposition that B and A1 imply E1] is asymmetrical. The fact that iron oxide is produced does 
not entail (along with [A1]) that a black powder is produced” (p. 361). The same asymmetry 
afflicts Priestley’s evidential inferences. Note that we cannot judge Priestley’s theory on E1 
and Lavoisier’s theory on E2. Each evidential statement is at best irrelevant to the other 
theory, at worst it disconfirms it. 
 
Basu does ponder at one point “whether it is possible to predict the (raw) data from the 
hypothesis by employing suitable auxiliary assumptions” (p. 362). He dismisses this 
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 Observations, Basu claims, need not be theory-laden but they cannot play a direct role in confirmation: 
“…although one could legitimately hold that there are observations that are not theory infected, such 
observations cannot be employed for theory resolution” (p. 356) [my emphasis]. 
3
 Priestley and Lavoisier agreed on various other observable results such as balance readings. They disagreed on 
whether the reaction only led to the production of black powder. Priestley thought that carbon dioxide was also 
produced. This disagreement is not important for our current discussion - Basu similarly sidelines it - as we are 
only interested in the inferential links between evidence and (commonly shared) observation statements. 
4
 A1 and A2 have a more complicated structure that for the sake of simplicity I leave out. This should not affect 
the conclusion of my argument since both auxiliaries appeal to the same Stahlian hypotheses to determine the 
purity of samples. 
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possibility two pages later, roundly asserting that “(raw) data never have any evidential 
bearing” (p. 364) [my emphasis]. In what follows, I contest this assertion by finding the 
requisite auxiliary assumptions that let us derive, predict and potentially explain observational 
report B. I do so by presenting a general strategy for constructing suitable auxiliaries that has 
applicability to a broad range of cases. This, as we shall shortly see, requires a detour via set-
theory. If my strategy is compelling it undermines not only Basu’s particular project but more 
generally Bogen and Woodward’s on which the former is firmly grounded in. 
 
Sets can be partitioned into various disjoint parts. More formally we say that a set P is a 
partition of a set S if and only if (1) all of P’s members are non-empty subsets of S, (2) the 
union of P’s members is co-extensional to S and (3) the intersection of any two members of P 
is empty.5 A peculiar aspect of this standard definition is that any set S (that can be 
partitioned) will have {S} among its partitions. For those interested in splitting the original set 
into two or more disjoint parts, a partition containing the original set as a member will of 
course be unwanted. To overcome this problem, let’s define another notion that prohibits such 
partitions, call it ‘partition*’. A set P is a partition* of a set S if and only if P fulfils the above 
three conditions (i.e. it is a partition of S) and P does not contain S as a member. Let’s denote 
such a set as Part*(S). Sets with less than two members cannot be partitioned*. For a set S 
with n members, the number of partitions* is given by the bell number of that set minus one.  
 
Predicates denote properties. Extensionally understood, properties are sets. That means that 
for any set there is one and only corresponding (natural or artificial) property, and vice-versa. 
This allows us to partition* properties by partitioning* their corresponding sets. Thus a 
partition* of a set S will have as members non-empty non-intersecting sets, each of which can 
be assigned a different property. Indeed, any property applicable to more than one object can 
be partitioned* into two or more properties each of which is distinct from one another and 
applicable to at least one object. Take the property of being a mammal. It can be partitioned* 
into a great number of properties, some of them corresponding to natural, others to artificial 
properties. Examples of (presumably) natural properties are the properties of primate, rodent, 
bat and dolphin. Examples of artificial properties are the properties of being a mammal half a 
meter long, being a mammal named ‘Alexa’ and weighing more than 500kg.6 
 
To remove any lingering unclarity, let us take a closer look at an example of a set being 
partitioned*. Suppose S = {1, 2, 3}. We know that this set has four partitions*, i.e. Part1*(S) = 
{ {1}, {2}, {3} }, Part2*(S) ={ {1, 2}, {3}}, Part3*(S) ={ {1, 3}, {2}}, Part4*(S) ={ {2, 3}, 
{1}}. Observe that each partition* contains as members sets that are mutually disjoint and 
whose union is set S. Qua sets, each member of a partition* of S can be assigned a property. 
Take for example Part*1(S). It contains three members, namely sets {1}, {2}, {3}. Each of 
these can be assigned a different property; we can use the predicates R1, R2 and R3 to denote 
these properties. Now if R is the predicate denoting the property corresponding to set S, then 
(x) (Rx ≡ (R1x ⊕ R2x ⊕ R3x)) where ⊕ stands for exclusive disjunction. All the partitions* of 
S can be given the same treatment. What is more, since partitioning* decomposes properties 
into mutually exclusive and exhaustive parts, inclusive disjunction formulations of such 
biconditionals – in the case at hand (x) (Rx ≡ (R1x v R2x v R3x)) – are logically equivalent to 
their exclusive disjunction counterparts. 
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 An alternative first condition does not exclude non-empty subsets of S, thereby allowing for partitions such as 
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 Overlapping properties such as being a mammal half a meter long and being a mammal named ‘Alexa’ do not 
of course belong to the same partitions* of the property mammals. 
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With these tools and results in mind, let us turn to the problem at hand. Given our move to 
predicate logic, atomic propositions O1, O2, E1, E2 and B are now taken to be predicates while 
complex propositions L, P, A1 and A2 are now quantified propositions. For example, 
theoretical auxiliary A1 now reads: (x) (Bx → E1x). Crucially, this universal generalisation 
implies that either E1 is co-extensional to B or B is a non-empty proper subset of E1.7 In the 
former case, this amounts to the bi-conditional statement A3: (x) (Bx ≡ E1x). If we add A3 as 
an auxiliary to our original set of propositions {O1a, L: (x) (O1x → E1x)} we can derive the 
desired sentence Ba, where a denotes the particular object that bears these properties. In the 
latter case, we can turn to the concept of partition* to derive an equally suitable statement. We 
know that B, qua a non-empty proper subset of E1, belongs to at least one partition* of E1.8 
Take such a partition*, let’s call it ‘C’. C is co-extensional to E1. It contains B as a member 
but also one or more other sets that are disjoint from B. We can assign a property and hence a 
predicate to each of them. Let us call these ‘C1’, … , ‘Cm’, where m is determined by the 
number of disjoint sets in C other than B. The following auxiliary can now be formulated A4: 
(x) (E1x ≡ (Bx ⊕ C1x ⊕ … ⊕ Cmx)). The properties on the right side of the biconditional are 
jointly co-extensional to the property on the left side. If we add A4 to our original set of 
propositions we can derive the following statement Ba ⊕ C1a … ⊕ Cma.9 Since Ba is one of 
the exclusive disjuncts, the observation that a has property B can confirm the theory and 
auxiliaries used in the derivation.10 Contra Basu, Ba need not first be transformed into theory-
laden evidence. 
 
Technicalities aside, the conclusion is supported by a very simple logical point. Suppose we 
are faced with the sort of asymmetry Basu talks about, i.e. we have a statement of the form 
‘All F’s are G’s’ but we really want a statement of the form ‘All G’s are F’s’ or at least some 
statement that allows us to go from G’s to F’s. If we know that all objects with property F 
have property G, we can infer that either some objects with property G have property F or all 
of them do. The latter case plays straight into our hands. The former needs a little spelling out. 
That’s where the partition* notion comes in, as it facilitates the spelling out by letting us 
decompose properties like G into F and non-F parts. Doing so allows us to conclude that an 
object with property G will also possess a property from a finite selection of mutually disjoint 
properties (partitioned* from G) that includes F. Thus finding an object with property F can 
confirm a theory which predicts the existence of objects with property G. To put things in 
perspective, suppose ‘G’ is an unobservable property and ‘F’ an observable one. Theories 
supplemented with the auxiliary ‘All F’s are G’s’ can be confirmed by observational reports 
of objects possessing property F. 
 
In a sense what I have argued for is unsurprising. An auxiliary of the form ‘evidence or 
phenomenon x implies observation y’ or something weaker like ‘evidence or phenomenon x 
implies (or raises the probability of) an exclusive disjunction one of whose disjuncts is an 
observation y’ is implicit in the scientists’ thoughts when they employ an inverse conditional, 
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i.e. when they infer from their observations some evidential report. Indeed, on pain of 
inconsistency, the scientists must have a biconditional or even an identity relation in mind. 
They take it that one of the manifestations of iron oxide (or iron calx) is black powder, hence 
they are in effect accepting a statement like ‘An object is iron oxide (or iron calx) iff/= it is 
black powder with certain observable reactions to other substances xor it is a red-brownish 
solid with certain observable reactions to other substances xor …’.  The availability of such 
auxiliaries and the inferential relations they engender undermines Bogen and Woodward's 
view that theories do not entail, predict or even potentially explain observation statements.  
 
Theories can it seems make direct contact with observation reports. It should be obvious that 
by ‘direct contact’ I do not mean anything that violates Duhem’s thesis that theories can never 
be tested in isolation. Rather, I mean that theories plus suitable theoretical auxiliaries can 
entail, predict and potentially explain observation statements or data. In short, the view 
developed in this section is perfectly compatible with various forms of holism.11 
 
It is worth noting that auxiliaries A3 and A4 are not merely stipulated but derived from the 
existing auxiliary A1. We can similarly derive auxiliaries A5, (x) (Bx ≡ E2x), and A6, (x) (E2x 
≡ (Bx ⊕ D1x ⊕ … ⊕ Dkx)), from A2 to allow Priestley’s theory to be tested by observations. 
Indeed, with the help of A5 and A6, Priestley’s theory can be confirmed by Ba. Since Ba can 
confirm both theories it cannot be used to discriminate between them. This problem is of no 
concern to us here since we are frying an altogether different fish. The aim was to show that 
theories plus suitable auxiliaries can be tested by observations, i.e. it was not to show that the 
presence of black powder discriminates between Lavoisier’s and Priestley’s theories. At any 
rate, in terms of theory testing we are not worse off than when we started since E1 and E2 are 
also unable to discriminate between the two theories. Moreover, the fact that one observation 
report cannot adjudicate between two theories (plus associated auxiliaries) does not entail that 
(1) it cannot adjudicate between those theories and others and (2) all observation reports are 
similarly impotent. 
 
Alas, things are even more complicated than I have let on so far. Auxiliaries A1 and A2 seem 
to have been ad-hoc stipulations since no independent reasons were given to support the 
claims that one of iron oxide’s or iron calx’s manifestations is black powder with certain 
observable properties. It is always preferable to have independent confirmation for a 
hypothesis prior to its utilisation but it is not absolutely necessary. Nowadays we can 
independently confirm Lavoisier’s auxiliary since we have distinct methods of analysing the 
chemical structure of the black powder residue. If no independent confirmation existed, the 
relevant auxiliary would be confirmationally impotent. Put differently, either the original 
auxiliaries that go from data to phenomena enjoy independent support and then so do the 
derived auxiliaries that go from phenomena to data or the original auxiliaries are ad-hoc 
postulations that play no genuine confirmational role but then they are of no interest to any 
party in the debate. 
 
3. Calculating the Melting Point of Lead 
We turn now to one of Bogen and Woodward’s most prominent examples. The sentence 
‘Lead melts at 327.5 °C’ can presumably be explained, derived and predicted from theories of 
molecular structure. In Bogen and Woodward’s view the sentence is not an observation report 
but rather a report about the phenomenon of the melting point of lead. The relevant 
observations or data come in the form of scatter points of temperature readings generated by a 
series of measurements. Provided various experimental conditions hold, e.g. that there is no 
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systematic error, that small uncontrolled causes of variation “operate independently, are 
roughly equal in magnitude, are as likely to be positive as negative, and have a cumulative 
effect which is additive” the mean of the data can be considered to be a good estimate of 
lead’s true melting point (1988, p. 308). The data thus serve as evidence for the phenomenon 
but they cannot be explained by, derived or predicted from the relevant theories of molecular 
structure because the mean of a given distribution “does not represent a property of any 
particular data point” and “it will not, unless we are lucky, coincide exactly with that value 
[i.e. the true value of the melting point]” (1988, pp. 308-9). On the basis of these two reasons, 
Bogen and Woodward conclude that the data in this and similar cases cannot serve as 
evidence for the corresponding theories. 
 
Let us consider more closely the two reasons Bogen and Woodward cite to prop up their 
conclusion. As I understand it the first holds that we cannot explain, derive or predict a datum 
from a mean because the latter represents a property of a set of data but not of any one of its 
members. The second reason holds that we cannot explain, derive or predict a given mean 
from the theoretically predicted value of the melting point – which in the example above 
Bogen and Woodward suppose to also be its true value – since the mean and theoretically 
predicted values need not be equivalent. Although the two reasons are strictly speaking 
correct, closely analogous derivations can be pulled off with the help of suitable auxiliaries. 
To wit, we can derive exclusive disjunctions whose disjuncts include the desired mean and 
datum.  
 
Take the second claim first. Suppose we want to derive a particular mean m1, which we 
assume for the sake of simplicity to satisfy the aforementioned experimental conditions, from 
a particular theoretically predicted value p1. We know that every mean m with some standard 
error ε corresponds to a different range r of theoretically predicted values of the melting point 
of lead such that r = {x: m-ε ≤ x ≤ m+ε}. Now take only those pairs of m and ε that fulfil the 
aforementioned experimental conditions, i.e. the pairs that are typically good estimates of 
lead’s true melting point. Let us call these ‘the selected pairs’ and their corresponding ranges 
‘the selected ranges’. Since Bogen and Woodward assume that the theories of molecular 
structure determine lead’s true melting point – this is not an essential assumption but it 
simplifies the derivation – we can infer that the selected pairs are typically good estimates of 
the theoretically predicted value of lead’s melting point p1. This means that the majority of 
selected ranges contain p1 as one of their members. Let us denote that set of selected ranges 
by R and the corresponding set of selected pairs by M. We can obviously derive M from p1. 
Provided m1 and standard error ε1 are good estimates of lead’s true melting point, as we have 
assumed above, (m1, ε1) ∈ M. To express this in a more familiar format, the pair (m1, ε1) will 
be one of several disjuncts in an exclusive disjunction that, contrary to Bogen and Woodward, 
we can derive from the theories of molecular structure plus the foregoing auxiliaries. 
 
The first claim can be handled similarly. Suppose we want to derive a datum d1 from a mean 
m1 which is determined by a particular data set one of whose members is d1. Like before 
suppose for simplicity’s sake that m1 satisfies the stated experimental conditions. We know 
that every mean m with some standard error ε corresponds to a unique range q of data sets of 
temperature readings of lead’s melting point. Obviously different data sets can have the same 
mean. That’s why the relevant auxiliary assigns to each mean a range of data sets, i.e. a set of 
data sets. Take those pairs of m and ε in M. Each of these has a corresponding range of data 
sets. Let us denote the set of all such ranges by D. We can obviously derive D from p1 and the 
other auxiliaries. We know already that the pair (m1, ε1) has a corresponding range of data 
sets, at least one of which contains d1. Since (m1, ε1) ∈ M we can infer that d1 is contained in 
at least one of the data sets contained in D. In other words, d1 will be one of several disjuncts 
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in an exclusive disjunction that, against Bogen and Woodward’s view, can be derived from 
the theories of molecular structure plus some suitable auxiliaries. 
 
4. Novel Predictions 
A significant gap exists in the writings of Bogen and Woodward. Nowhere do they 
systematically and explicitly discuss the role of novel predictions, considered by many as the 
Holy Grail in confirmation, in the relationship between data, phenomena and theories.12 In 
this section, I will argue that novel predictions are particularly damaging to Bogen and 
Woodward’s claim that data cannot serve as evidence for theories. To make this point I will 
look into two paradigmatic cases of novel prediction. 
 
The notion of novel prediction can be understood in a handful of competing ways. These can 
roughly be classified under two broad categories: temporal and use. Temporal novelty requires 
that what is predicted be in some sense unknown prior to a theory’s prediction of it.13 The 
sense of unknown depends on the particular temporal restrictions advocated. For instance, one 
may require that what is predicted must not be widely known or that it must be unknown to 
the theoretician who makes the prediction. Examples that satisfy both stringent and liberal 
criteria of temporal novelty include the two cases that I will shortly be examining, namely the 
prediction of the Poisson spot and the prediction of the existence and properties of Neptune. 
These two cases can also be accounted for by the notion of use novelty which requires that 
what is predicted is not in some sense used in the construction of the theory that makes the 
prediction.14 As before, the sense of used depends on the particular restrictions advocated. For 
instance, some require that what is predicted must not be the explanatory target of the 
individual who designed the theory, while others that it must merely not be used to fix the 
value of one or more of the theory’s parameters.15 An example that perhaps satisfies both 
stringent and liberal criteria of use novelty is Newton’s prediction of the rate of precession of 
the equinoxes. This example does not qualify under any temporal novelty account since the 
rate of precession of the equinoxes was not only widely known to scientists at the time but 
also known to Newton himself. 
 
Some scholars have questioned the idea that theories can be confirmed at all. Of those who 
accept that theories can be confirmed, however, none denies that at least some of the 
examples cited as cases of novel prediction have sharp confirmational power.16 The Poisson 
spot and Neptune cases were chosen precisely because they are generally acknowledged to 
have acute confirmational power. As I already alluded, both cases satisfy stringent and liberal 
criteria of temporal and use novelty. For this reason, they present a first-rate test of Bogen and 
Woodward’s view in the arena of novel predictions. 
 
Let us first consider the Poisson spot case. In 1819 Augustin Fresnel entered his wave theory 
of light in the French Academy of Science competition on the diffraction of light. The 
panellists consisted mostly of supporters of the particle theory of light, which was dominant at 
the time. One such panellist, Siméon-Denis Poisson, attempted to disprove Fresnel’s theory 
by deriving from it what he and others considered to be an absurd consequence. If Fresnel’s 
theory was right, a bright spot should appear in the middle of a disk’s circular shadow when 
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illuminated by a narrow beam of light. François Arago, one of the other panellists, performed 
the experiment and to everyone’s disbelief observed the bright spot. As a result Fresnel’s 
wave theory received a hard-earned confirmational boost. To make sense of this 
confirmational boost it is necessary that theories and data are more proximal than what Bogen 
and Woodward would have us believe. After all, without some guidance from suitable 
auxiliaries Poisson and Arago would not have known what to look for in order to judge 
whether Fresnel’s theory was right. This guidance came in the form of an auxiliary hypothesis 
that connects the theoretical prediction of constructive interference in the centre of the disk’s 
circular shadow to the observation of a bright spot. In other words, it was acceptable to both 
parties in the debate that constructive interference implies brighter regions. Without this 
assumption, which incidentally still stands today, Poisson would not have been able to predict 
the bright spot that he thought would undo Fresnel’s theory. 
 
The same point can be raised in the context of the discovery of Neptune. Urbain Jean Joseph 
Le Verrier and John Couch Adams worked independently on explaining Uranus’ irregular 
orbit. Both men hypothesised the existence of a planet with enough mass to gravitationally 
perturb Uranus’s orbit and employed Newtonian calculations to identify its properties and 
whereabouts. Le Verrier sent his predictions to J.G. Galle at the Berlin Observatory, who 
detected the planet on September 23 1846 at approximately the exact location forecasted by 
Le Verrier – the predicted true longitude was at 326º0´ whereas the observed one was at 
326º57´ (see C. J. Brookes 1970). Soon after the discovery, but not before some wrangling, 
the planet was named ‘Neptune’. Once again to make sense of the prediction it is necessary 
that theories and data enjoy a close relationship. Without some guidance from suitable 
auxiliaries Le Verrier, Adams and Galle would not have known what to look for in the 
telescopic observations that led to Neptune’s discovery. The requisite auxiliary connects the 
theoretical prediction of a massive object with a specific orbit to the telescopic observation of 
a bright dot that appears in a particular part of the sky at a particular time at night. Without 
this assumption, which also stands today, Galle and others would not have been able to detect 
the planet via telescopic observations.  
 
It ought to be painfully obvious that almost without exception suitable auxiliaries connecting 
theories, phenomena and data need to be at hand in the cases of novel prediction. Such 
auxiliaries play the crucial role of informing scientists about the observable manifestations of 
physical phenomena. To put the point about novel predictions in the realist’s vocabulary: The 
view that suitable auxiliaries are required in the case of novel predictions is the only (or at 
least the best) view that does not make our knowledge of what observations to make in order 
to confirm or disconfirm a theory a miracle. Even well entrenched theories can be undone 
when the right data comes along. Within a few years of Poisson’s prediction and Arago’s 
observation the wave theory became the dominant theory of light.  
 
5. Conclusion 
It has not been argued here that theories can always make contact with the observational 
ground. Instead, it has been argued that in those cases where the phenomena are inferred from 
the theories and the data do indeed serve as evidence for the phenomena, the data also serve 
as evidence for the theories. Four cases were analysed in support of this claim. In each of 
these cases suitable auxiliaries were available to effect the derivation and prediction of data 
from the theories. This lends more credence to the view that observations and theories enjoy 
much more direct contact than Bogen and Woodward are willing to admit. 
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